

## PIETAS, POMPEIANI AND CICERO'S THIRTEENTH PHILIPPIC

© KATHRYN WELCH

UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY

Although Cicero looked forward to a fresh panel of magistrates to free him from the shackles of the consulship of Marcus Antonius and P. Cornelius Dolabella, 43BC began with an inconclusive four-day Senatorial debate.<sup>1</sup> Antonius himself, after his departure from the city in late November 44, had travelled to Cisalpine Gaul with his army and on reaching the town of Mutina had placed it under siege. This move shut Decimus Brutus and his forces inside the town during the winter of 44–43. Armies were on the move but from January to April, politics remained deadlocked in Rome, where Antonius' allies, led by Q. Fufius Calenus, were successful in staving off Cicero's constant calls for a *hostis* declaration against him.

During these months, M. Brutus and Cassius began to make real headway in seizing control of the key provincial areas of Macedonia, Asia and Syria<sup>2</sup> and continued the process, begun in the middle of 44, of gathering a fleet.<sup>3</sup>

The assassins' increasing control of these provinces and the sea lanes as well as the escalation of the military situation at Mutina provides an important context for understanding the changing role of Sextus Pompeius in the unfolding drama of 43BC. This paper seeks to trace that role by contrasting Cicero's Fifth Philippic, delivered on 1 January 43, with the Thirteenth, delivered in the following March (perhaps 20 March). Pompeius is not overly prominent in either. However, the difference in treatment marks a shift in his significance for Cicero as well as others, including Marcus Antonius, who had a stake in the complicated

---

<sup>1</sup> App. *BC* 3.51; Dio 46.29; Frisch 1946, 237–242; Manuwald 2007, 536–550; 905–913; Steel 2008.

<sup>2</sup> Drum 2003, 348–349; Cassius arrived in Syria in December; M. Brutus had sent Herostratus to Macedonia in November (Plut. *Brut.* 24.2); Hortensius handed over troops around the time of C. Antonius' arrival (App. *BC* 4.58; Dio 47.21–22; 47.28; Bailey 1980, 6); C. Antonius left for Macedonia in early December.

<sup>3</sup> *MRR* 2.320–321; *Phil.* 11.35. Beginnings of a fleet: *Att.* 15.12[390].1; 16. 2[412].4; 4[411].4; 3[413].6; L. Tillius Cimber's fleet (mid-43): *Fam.* 12.13[419].3.

politics of 44 and 43. I also hope to show that Pompeius was far more significant to the shifting manoeuvres of all parties than Cicero's minimal treatment of him suggests.

By November 44, Pompeius had been restored to citizenship through his agreement with M. Lepidus. However, instead of returning to Rome, he remained in Massilia, a city which had previously displayed great friendship towards his father.<sup>4</sup> Cicero provides very little contextual background in the fifth Philippic. He refers to Pompeius' restitution only because he wants to stress the honours that had been awarded to Lepidus for bringing about a settlement of the military situation in Spain (*Phil.* 5.39–41). In order to emphasise the connection between Lepidus and the Republic, he lavishly praises both the sons of Pompeius *pater*, expressing his joy at the prospect of the younger son's imminent return and his sorrow at the elder's premature death. Any untoward actions on their part are excused on the grounds of their *pietas* (*Phil.* 5.39):

quod si eadem ratio Caesari{s} fuisset in illo taetro miseroque bello, ut omittam patrem, duos Cn. Pompei, summi et singularis uiri, filios incolumis haberemus; quibus certe pietas fraudi{s} esse non debuit. utinam omnis M. Lepidus seruare potuisset! facturum fuisse declarauit in eo quod potuit, cum Sex. Pompeium restituit ciuitati, maximum ornamentum rei publicae, clarissimum monumentum clementiae suae. grauis illa fortuna populi Romani, graue fatum: Pompeio enim patre, quod imperi[o] populi Romani lumen fuit, extincto interfectus est patris simillimus filius. sed omnia mihi uidentur deorum immortalium iudicio expiata Sex. Pompeio rei publicae conseruato.

If Caesar had taken the same course in that hideous and miserable struggle, we should have the two sons of Gnaeus Pompeius, that most remarkable and eminent man, safe in our midst (to say nothing of their father). Assuredly their *pietas* should not have been to their disadvantage. If only Marcus Lepidus could have saved all of them! That he would have done so he made plain by doing what he could, in restoring Sextus Pompeius to the community, a shining ornament of the *res publica*, a most notable memorial of his own clemency. Grievous was that stroke of fortune to the Roman People, a grievous destiny: after Pompeius the father, who was the beacon of the Empire of the Roman People, was snuffed out, his son, who resembled him so closely, was slain. But it seems to me that by the judgement of the Immortal Gods the preservation of Sextus Pompeius for the *res publica* has made amends for all.

---

<sup>4</sup> *Phil.* 13.13; App. *BC* 4.84. On Massilia's friendship with Pompeius *pater* see Caesar *BC* 1.34; 2.3–7; 2.56–59. In the Eighth Philippic Cicero charges Q. Fufius Calenus with bitterly criticising Massilia without even hinting at why he might have been doing so (*Phil.* 8.18–19).

Cicero's terms of the praise are noticeably vague. Moreover, a few paragraphs later, he excludes Pompeius *pater* from a list of precedents cited to confer respectability on the younger Caesar with whom only days before he had announced he was now in alliance.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, he proposes a very unflattering comparison between the Great Man and his new ally (*Phil.* 5.44):

illius opibus Sulla regnavit: huius praesidio Antoni dominatus oppressus est.

With Pompeius' help, Sulla reigned; by Caesar's intervention, Antonius' despotism has been crushed.

In January 43, Cicero was only marginally interested in promoting the image of Pompeius *pater* or his sons. He was pursuing a different agenda: attempting to persuade the supporters of the younger Caesar to join him in the fight against Antonius and, above all, to have Antonius declared an enemy of the state. For his part, Antonius had already begun to develop the theme of the *partes Pompeianae* as a hostile rhetorical strategy, using it to claim that the basis of the quarrel, and indeed of the plot to kill the Dictator, was factional strife between Caesarians and Pompeians (*Phil.* 5.32). Cicero responded by scoffing that so serious a matter had been reduced to anything so flimsy: the alliance against Antonius united all right-thinking citizens, including those who were *e mediis C. Caesaris partibus*, namely the consuls Aulus Hirtius and C. Vibius Pansa and Caesar's heir. He carefully avoids using such a term as *Pompeianus*, even preferring *uictus* to describe himself and others who had previously opposed the Dictator. Thus, both his new alliance with the younger Caesar and Antonius' strategy of division served to limit and nuance Cicero's treatment of all three Pompeii throughout this and other speeches of late 44 and early 43.<sup>6</sup> One might assume a degree of personal choice at play, particularly with respect to the sons, for whom he had in fact shown a marked lack of enthusiasm, but only the contemporary political climate of early 43 can explain the ambivalence he publicly evinced towards his former ally, the elder

---

<sup>5</sup> *Phil.* 5.47–8. On the late date of the alliance between Cicero and the young Caesar see Stone 2008, 224.

<sup>6</sup> Welch 2002, 9–13; Stone 2008, 225. Traces exist in our sources of the care the assassins had taken to separate the planning, executing and defending Caesar's murder from any suspicion that it was enacted for personal revenge or because of 'party' considerations.

Pompeius. Such sentiments indicate the difficulty Cicero faced in bringing sympathetic former Caesarians into the fold.

On the other hand, as a potential ally residing in an accessible western Mediterranean sea port and in command of considerable land and naval forces, Pompeius could not be ignored for long. Cicero in Italy and the assassins in the East were steadily gearing up for armed conflict and both had reason to keep Pompeius in their sights. At some point, usually thought to be January, envoys had gone north on a mission to an unknown destination. According to Cicero, they included a visit to Massilia on their itinerary in order to ascertain Pompeius' willingness to assist in the fight against Antonius at Mutina.<sup>7</sup> We know of the embassy only through Cicero's convoluted description of it in the Thirteenth Philippic (*Phil.* 13.13):

Ac ne illud quidem silentio, patres conscripti, praetereundum puto quod clarissimi uiri legati, L. Paulus, Q. Thermus, C. Fannius, quorum habetis cognitam uoluntatem in rem publicam eamque perpetuam atque constantem, nuntiant se Pompei conueniundi causa deuertisse Massiliam eumque cognouisse paratissimo animo, ut cum suis copiis iret ad Mutinam, ni ueretur, ne ueteranorum animos offenderet.

Moreover, senators, there is another matter which should not be passed over in silence, namely that the eminent envoys Lucius Paullus, Quintus Thermus and Gaius Fannius whose unflagging and steadfast good will towards the state is obvious to you, report that they made a detour to Massilia in order to meet with Pompeius and found him ready for action and that he would have gone to Mutina with his forces if he had not been afraid of offending the veterans (Bailey).

The passage provides evidence that an official overture was made to Pompeius in the wake of Antonius' departure from Rome. It alerts us to the substantial resources still at his disposal. It is also clear that while he had not been the ambassadors' main target he had significant forces

---

<sup>7</sup> Hadas (1930, 65) assumes that Cicero was the guiding force behind the embassy ('doubtless at Cicero's suggestion'). If this had been the case, he almost certainly would have at least hinted at his role. John Ramsey and Roger Pitcher both remarked to me that the embassy bears a great deal of further thought and it is a pity that this is our only notice of it. The men were senior and L. Aemilius Paullus' presence is particularly intriguing, if, as commentators suggest, the embassy was on its way to M. Lepidus. Q. Thermus and C. Fannius had supported Pompeius *pater* and Thermus (and perhaps the same Fannius) were to be among the last to desert Sextus Pompeius in 35 (Welch 2002, 47–49). All three later had to escape the Triumvirs' soldiers during the Proscriptions. At the very least, the fact that we depend on this one reference should alert us to the possibility that there were other embassies about which we hear nothing and that Cicero was not the only player on the Republican side with an agenda at stake.

with him which they wanted to see added to the other armies on their way to the defence of Decimus Brutus.<sup>8</sup> Pompeius' response had been positive but not what Cicero had wanted to hear: he was absolutely at the ready (*paratissimo animo*) to fight for the *res publica* but he refused to assist the campaign at Mutina through an acute sensitivity to the attitude of Caesar's veterans.

The Fifth Philippic reflects the context of early January 43; the Thirteenth Philippic that of March. In February, Dolabella had killed another leading assassin, Gaius Trebonius, at that time governor of Asia.<sup>9</sup> The Senate reacted with horror. Calenus himself proposed that Dolabella be condemned as a public enemy.<sup>10</sup> In doing so he was almost certainly attempting to stave off a similar declaration against M. Antonius which Cicero had wanted all year. The attempt was successful: Cicero was unable to persuade the senators that Antonius was as bad as Dolabella, though he tried; he also failed to have the task of pursuing Dolabella assigned to Cassius. However, concern about Dolabella's action made the Senate much more amenable to the possibility of open conflict at Mutina and by 20 March, the date usually assigned to the delivery of this speech, Pansa, the second consul and Calenus' son-in-law, had left Rome to join forces with those who were camped within striking distance of Antonius' forces.<sup>11</sup> Antonius reacted by writing an open letter to Hirtius and the younger Caesar, calling upon them to remember which side they should be on. They passed the letter on to Cicero who quotes extensively from it throughout the Thirteenth Philippic.<sup>12</sup>

Because of a change in circumstances and politics, Cicero was readier than he had been at any stage since 48 to admit to his 'Pompeianitas'. In stark contrast to the Fifth Philippic, he opens the speech by exonerating Pompeius *pater* from causing the civil war of 49, noting

---

<sup>8</sup> App. *BC* 4.84; Dio 48.17.1. Drum (2003, 214–216).

<sup>9</sup> *Phil.* 11.1; 12.25; 13.22–23; App. *BC* 4.58; Dio 47.29

<sup>10</sup> *Phil.* 11.15.

<sup>11</sup> Bailey (1985, 299) suggests 'probably on 20 March'. *Phil.* 13.46–47 (20 March) implies that Pansa has just left: Galba (*Fam.* 10.30[378].1) says that he was to have joined Hirtius on 14 April.

<sup>12</sup> On the competing strategies of both Antonius and Cicero in this exchange, now see Ramsey 2009.

only his failure to break the negotiation deadlock in the weeks that followed the crossing of the Rubicon. Even in this case, Cicero juxtaposes the *summa grauitas* of his former ally with Caesar's *cupiditas*.<sup>13</sup> This is in clear contrast to his surprising even-handedness in apportioning blame to both sides of the civil wars of the previous two generations (*Phil.* 13.1–2):

Itaque siue Sulla siue Marius siue uterque siue Octavius siue Cinna siue iterum Sulla siue alter Marius et Carbo siue qui alius ciuile bellum optauit, eum detestabilem ciuem rei publicae natum iudico. Nam quid ego de proximo dicam cuius acta defendimus, auctorem ipsum iure caesum fatemur? Nihil igitur hoc ciue, nihil hoc homine taetrius, si aut ciuis aut homo habendus est, qui ciuile bellum concupiscit. Sed hoc primum uidendum est, patres conscripti, cum omnibusne pax esse possit an sit aliquod bellum inexpiabile, in quo pactio pacis lex sit seruitutis. Pacem cum Scipione Sulla siue faciebat siue simulabat, non erat desperandum, si conuenisset, fore aliquem tolerabilem statum ciuitatis. Cinna si concordiam cum Octauio confirmare uoluisset, <aliqua> [hominum] in re publica sanitas remanere potuisset. Proximo bello si aliquid de summa grauitate Pompeius, multum de cupiditate Caesar remisisset, et pacem stabilem et aliquam rem publicam nobis habere licuisset.

Whoever has desired civil war, be it Sulla or Marius or both, be it Octavius or Cinna, be it Sulla a second time or the other Marius and Carbo, or anyone else, I hold him a citizen born accursed to the Republic. Why should I speak of the latest example, a man whose acts we defend while admitting that their author was justly slain? There is no fouler thing than such a citizen, such a man, if he is to be deemed a citizen or a man, who desires a civil war. But one point has to be considered at the outset, Members of the Senate: is peace with all men possible, or is there such a thing as an inexpiable war, in which a pact of peace is a prescription for slavery? When Sulla tried, or pretended to try, to make peace with Scipio, it was not unreasonable to hope that if they came to terms a tolerable state of the community would emerge. If Cinna had been willing to come to an agreement with Octavius, the Republic might have retained some degree of health. In the latest war, if Pompeius had been a little less stiffly steadfast and Caesar a great deal less greedy, we could have had a stable peace and some semblance of a Republic. (Bailey, Manuwald & Ramsey)

Later in the speech, Cicero characterises 'the Pompeiani' as the original defenders of the traditional state, whom all right thinking men had now joined (*Phil.* 13.28–9). He even happily pleads guilty to Antonius' charge that he was the *dux uictus*, the leader of 'the defeated faction' which, from his point of view, was actually the whole *res publica* minus

---

<sup>13</sup> Note that Pompeius' *grauitas* is much less than Caesar's *cupiditas*: aliquid de summa grauitate Pompeius, multum de cupiditate Caesar remisisset.

Antonius (*Phil.* 13.30). He claims the right as the elder Pompeius' best friend to oversee the younger's return to civic health and property (*Phil.* 13.10–11) and to sponsor his nomination to the augurate, acknowledging openly the duty he owed to the father who had done the same for him.<sup>14</sup> The Thirteenth Philippic is Cicero's most 'Pompeian' moment in the corpus but he affords to Magnus' living son none of the enthusiastic acclaim of which he was capable and had used when necessary, even for suspects such as Lepidus. His rhetoric is nuanced and even backhanded. What is going on?

Cicero's treatment of Pompeius falls between sections 9 to 13. The generalisations of the Fifth Philippic give way to a focus on Pompeius himself and his place as the son of his father (he is referred to as such eight times in the course of four paragraphs).<sup>15</sup> Moreover, Cicero's syntax suggests a unique relationship between Pompeius and the personified *Res Publica*. Throughout the corpus of the Philippics, Cicero usually places in oblique cases or passive/intransitive constructions.<sup>16</sup> At *Phil.* 13.9, however, the *res publica* is the active partner in a vital relationship: she will behold (*aspiciet*) Pompeius, she will enfold him in her embrace (*suo sinu complexuque recipient*); she will think herself made whole once again (*cum illo se ipsam sibi restitutam putabit*). One can imagine an Iphigenia or Electra recognising her brother or, even more readily, a Creusa embracing her son after having tried more than once to kill him without knowing who he really was.

At *Phil.* 13.10, Cicero invites Lepidus to compare Pompeius with the Antonii:

Existimasne igitur, M. Lepide, qualem Pompeium res publica habitura sit ciuem, talis futuros in re publica Antonios? in altero pudor, grauitas, moderatio, integritas; in illis – et cum hos compello, praetereo animo ex grege latrocini neminem – libidines, scelera, ad omne facinus immanis audacia.

---

<sup>14</sup> *Phil.* 13.12: ut quod a patre accepi filio reddam (thus returning to the son what I received from the father). Cicero was nominated by Cn. Pompeius and Q. Hortensius (*Phil.* 2.4).

<sup>15</sup> *Phil.* 13.8; 9; 10; 11; 12 (x3); 13. Also *Phil.* 13.50.

<sup>16</sup> The exceptions are *Phil.* 2.113 (the *res publica* has avenged itself, it has not recovered; she has many most noble young men prepared to defend her); 10.14 (the *res publica* holds Macedonia, Illyricum and Greece due to the prompt action of M. Brutus); 12.24 (the *res publica* has preserved Cicero's life); 13.8 (the *res publica* holds Lepidus to herself with many strong bonds).

Well, Marcus Lepidus, do you think that the *res publica* will find in Pompeius the kind of citizen which the Antonii will be to the *res publica*? In him there is modesty, responsibility, even-handedness and honesty; in them (and along with them I cannot help thinking of every one of their robber gang) lusts, crimes and a monstrous effrontery ready for any circumstance.

Pompeius has *pudor* and *moderatio* (representing Temperance) and *integritas* (representing Justice). In contrast, the Antonii are full of *libidines*, *scelera* and *audacia*, which will lead to even greater criminality. Cicero then dwells on the horror of a son of the great Pompeius having to buy back the Pompeian estate while he takes yet another swipe at the temerity of anyone (especially Antonius) associated with its sale (*Phil.* 13.10–12). In rounding up his description of the embassy and its outcome, he adds, or appears to add, *sapientia* and *fortitudo* to Pompeius' virtues of *moderatio* and *integritas* (*Phil.* 13.13):

est uero eius patris filius qui sapienter faciebat non minus multa quam fortiter. itaque intellegitis et animum ei praesto fuisse nec consilium defuisse.

Truly he is the son of his father, whose acts of wisdom were no less numerous than his acts of valour. So you see that his courage was ready and his discretion did not fail him.

Cicero then returns to his admonition of Lepidus.

Cicero's honorific proposal concerning Pompeius also refers to Pompeius' own qualities as well as those of his father and family (*Phil.* 13.50):

Magnum Pompeium, Gnaei filium, pro patris maiorumque suorum animo studioque in rem publicam suaque pristina uirtute, industria, uoluntate fecisse quod suam eorumque quos secum haberet operam senatui populoque Romano pollicitus esset, eamque rem senatui populoque Romano gratam acceptamque esse, eique honori dignitatique eam rem fore.

That Magnus Pompeius, son of Gnaeus, has acted in a manner worthy of the spirit and patriotic zeal of his father and ancestors and of his own former courage, diligence and good will in that he promised his services and those of his companions to the Senate and the People of Rome; and that his action is welcome and pleasing to the Senate and People of Rome and will redound to his honour and dignity.

Cicero's reference to four virtues (*integritas; moderatio/pudor; sapientia; fortitudo*) in connection with Pompeius is a signal that the young man should be thought of as being

among the elite group of defenders of the *res publica*.<sup>17</sup> The terminology is carefully selected to link the young man with his father whom on hearing of his death Cicero described as *homo integer et castus et grauis*.<sup>18</sup> Yet the praise does not ring true. Pompeius' courage is especially muted: he was *afraid* lest he might upset the soldiers (*uereretur ne ueteranorum animos offenderet*).<sup>19</sup> Such a choice of terms is not the language one uses of a person whose courage is not in doubt. In point of fact, Pompeius' *fortitudo* had been demonstrated by his victories over Carrinas and C. Asinius Pollio in Spain.<sup>20</sup> Of course, one might argue that Cicero was constrained: these victories had been over men he was at that point trying to maintain as allies. However, it was not beyond his rhetorical ability to overcome the difficulty.<sup>21</sup> Instead, Pompeius' courage is left to rest entirely on a promise of action which he refuses to fulfil. In the closing proposal, Cicero calls the *uirtus* of Pompeius *pristina*, introducing the uncomfortable thought that it had been lost and needed to be recovered.<sup>22</sup> We are left with the uncomfortable probability that Cicero chooses a low register to present Pompeius' courage.

There is little joy to be had from Cicero's adscription of Wisdom to Pompeius either. Cicero has already had something to say about the misplaced wisdom of the cautious who were

---

<sup>17</sup> Stone 2008, 220–227.

<sup>18</sup> *Att.* 11.6.[217].5. Within five chapters of the speech (8–13), Cicero makes eight references to Sextus Pompeius as the son of Magnus. On four occasions (13.9; 10; 12 ;13) as well as in the formal notice of motion (13.50) , he is specifically 'Cn.(Pompei) filius'.

<sup>19</sup> I thank Martin Stone for pointing out the extremely back-handed nature of Cicero's 'compliment' at *Phil.* 13.13 and also for introducing me to the importance of Cicero's use of the four cardinal virtues (Stone 2008).

<sup>20</sup> Dio 45.10.3–6; App. *BC* 4.83–84, with Magnino 1998, 229; Vell. 2.73.2, with Woodman 1983, 177.

<sup>21</sup> Compare, for example, the technique employed at *pro Sestio* 62. I thank Kit Morrell for the reference.

<sup>22</sup> Sall. *Iug.* 49.2; *Cat.* 58.12; 60.3. Cicero uses the phrase on only one other occasion. At *Fam.* 10.28[364].1 (about 2 Feb. 43), he speaks of *ille suus pristinus animus* returning on the departure of Antonius and in the next paragraph recalls the Senate, *languens* and *defessus*, to its *pristina uirtus* and *consuetudo*. It does not always mean 'lost' but can do so in certain contexts. Caesar's usage is hortatory though he would never insult his soldiers or Q. Cicero by suggesting they needed to recover their *uirtus*—they simply needed to ensure that they did not fall short of their own high standard (*BG* 2.21; 5.48; 3.62; *BC* 3.28). Given Cicero's lack of interest in the word, it has a jarring effect in this passage.

prepared to accept the slavery of peace.<sup>23</sup> In a marvellous display of passionate rousing oratory, he calls the Senate to Death or Glory rather than slavery under the Antonian yoke.<sup>24</sup> (*Phil.* 13.6–8):

Sed quoniam ab hoc ordine non fortitudo solum uerum etiam sapientia postulatur—quamquam uix uidentur haec posse seiungi, seiungamus tamen—fortitudo dimicare iubet, iustum odium incendit, ad confligendum impellit, uocat ad periculum: quid sapientia? Cautioribus utitur consiliis, in posterum prouidet, est omni ratione tector. Quid igitur censet? Parendum est enim atque id optimum iudicandum quod sit sapientissime constitutum. Si hoc praecipit ne quid uita existimem antiquius, ne decernam capitis periculo, fugiam omne discrimen, quaeram ex ea: ‘Etiamne, si erit, cum id fecero, seruiendum?’ Si aduerit, ne ego sapientiam istam, quamuis sit erudita, non audiam. Sin responderit: ‘Tu uero ita uitam corpusque seruato, ita fortunas, ita rem familiarem, ut haec libertate posteriora ducas itaque his uti uelis, si libera re publica possis, nec pro his libertatem, sed pro libertate haec proicias tamquam pignora iniuriae <oblata>,’ tum sapientiae uocem audire uidear eique uti deo paream. Itaque si receptis illis esse possumus liberi, uincamus odium pacemque patiamur; sin otium incolumibus eis esse nullum potest, laetemur decertandi oblatam esse fortunam. Aut enim interfectis illis fruemur uictrix re publica aut oppressi—quod omen auertat Iuppiter!—si non spiritu, at uirtutis laude uiuemus.

But since not only courage but wisdom too is demanded from this body—the two seem hardly separable, but let us separate them all the same—well, courage commands us to fight, kindles just hatred in our hearts, urges us to contend, summons us to danger. And what does wisdom do? She employs more cautious counsels, she looks ahead to consequences, she is altogether more guarded. What, then, is her advice? For it must be obeyed; the wisest decision is to be judged the best. If she instructs me to deem nothing more important than life, not to risk my life in perilous battle, to shun all danger, I shall ask her a question: ‘Even if, having done all this, I am to be a slave?’ If she nods assent, then I for one shall refuse to listen to that wisdom, whatever her learning. But if she replies: ‘No. Preserve your life and body, your fortunes and property, but only as valuing them less than freedom and as desiring to enjoy them only if you can do so in a free Republic, and do not sacrifice liberty in exchange for those things but them for liberty, regarding them as pledges exposed to ill-usage,’ then I would think I am hearing the voice of wisdom and would obey as I would obey a god. Therefore, if we can take those people back and still be free, let us conquer our hatred and put up with

---

<sup>23</sup> Cicero was not uniformly enthusiastic about the elder Pompeius’ wisdom. In the course of the Second Philippic (and in a period when he was treading delicately around his involvement in the earlier civil war) he suggested that Pompeius had not been wise enough (*Phil.* 2.24; Stone 2008, 238). In both his virtues and lack of them, Sextus Pompeius is conceptualised as a carbon copy of his father (see above n. 19).

<sup>24</sup> One cannot help but be reminded of the opening sentences of Tacitus’ *Annals* (*Ann.* 1.2) where he charges the survivors of the thirties with having given up the fight.

peace. But if there can be no quiet in the community if they are part of it, let us rejoice that we have been given the opportunity to fight it out. For either they will be killed and we shall enjoy a victorious Republic or, if overwhelmed—may Jupiter avert the omen! — we shall live, if not with breath, yet with the glory of valour. (Bailey, Manuwald & Ramsey)

To whom is Cicero speaking? Surely not just to Antonius' friends. Cicero's addressees are fellow travellers opposed to Antonius but also wary of the strategy Cicero had chosen to take. Earlier, Cicero had specifically berated anyone who paid too much attention to the sentiments of the veterans (*Phil.* 10.18), suggesting that Pompeius was not the only potential ally who feared fighting alongside the troops under the command of Hirtius and the young Caesar. We know that M. Brutus felt this way. It is worth noting that Cicero charges Brutus with being 'overly temperate' in his dealings with Gaius Antonius and with regard to Marcus as well.<sup>25</sup> Cicero's problem at this point was not with the former Caesarians who now surrounded Caesar's son and who wanted to fight Antonius. It was with others like Brutus and, it would appear, Pompeius, who were suspicious of his strategy.

Cicero cannot leave Pompeius out of the script, which suggests that he had become too important to pass over in silence. The fact that Cicero concludes his speech with a vote of thanks to Pompeius and his followers is evidence that he knew what was expected and chose to acknowledge it. However, his muted and nuanced praise for Pompeius on close inspection reveals his disappointment in the response which was given to the ambassadors. Cicero thus focuses his enthusiasm, such as it is, on Pompeius' *moderatio* and *integritas* while finding his *fortitudo* wanting and his *sapientia* problematic.

Of course, the speech is not about Pompeius. The target is Antonius and his concerted effort to recall Hirtius and Caesar back to their 'natural' *partes*. And beyond Antonius was the spectre of Lepidus whom Cicero was desperately attempting to keep as an ally when he knew full well that he was clutching at straws. Antonius had said all along that it was necessary for all those who had received benefits from the Dictator to avenge his death and, despite Calenus' actions in Rome, he had ramped up this language in the wake of Trebonius'

---

<sup>25</sup> That M. Brutus and the other assassins had too much temperance is a strong theme throughout Cicero's letters to them (eg *AdBr* 2.5[5]). See also *Phil.* 10.7; 14; 23 and Stone 2008, 239.

execution.<sup>26</sup> Along with his brother Lucius, who would later add ‘Pietas’ to his name,<sup>27</sup> Antonius had extended the duty of *pietas* to include exacting punishment on the murderers of the *pater patriae* and those who had sympathised with the cause.

The theme of better and best *pietas* is critical to the main strategy of the Thirteenth Philippic. In keeping with his nuanced use of praise language in sections 9–13, Cicero made no reference to Pompeius’ claims to a virtue for which he was already famous and which Cicero had earlier acknowledged (*Phil.* 5.39).<sup>28</sup> He cannot, and the reason becomes clear when we consider Antonius’ *pietas* onslaught. The theme comes through clearly in the letter Cicero uses throughout the middle sections of the speech but we can also extract it from his own opening sentence which rails against *impii consceleratique ciues* (*Phil.* 13.1).<sup>29</sup> At *Phil.* 13.4, Cicero exclaims sarcastically:

o fidam dexteram Antoni qua ille plurimos ciuis trucidauit, o ratum religiosumque foedus quod cum Antoniis fecerimus! hoc si Marcus uiolare conabitur Luci eum sanctitas a scelere reuocabit.

Oh trustworthy right hand of Antonius by which he has slaughtered so many citizens. Such a binding and sacred treaty we will make with the Antonii! Should Marcus attempt to break it, the probity of Lucius will summon him back from crime.

Marcus’ right hand was *fida*; Lucius possessed *sanctitas*. With heavy irony, Cicero employed the language of *pietas* to dismiss the idea that a settlement could still be made with Antonius (*Phil.* 13.37), ‘o conseruandus ciuis cum tanto pio iustoque foedere’. (‘What a citizen we must preserve, along with such an honourable and just agreement!’). In response to Antonius’ claim that he would never betray his alliance with Lepidus, the *piissimus* of men,

---

<sup>26</sup> On the constancy of Antonius’ position despite the constraints of the amnesty, see Ramsey 2001.

<sup>27</sup> Later in 41, Antonius would associate his brother Lucius’ consulship with *Pietas*, the cognomen he had chosen for himself and advertised in the same year (*RRC* 516; 517.3–5; Dio 48.5.4).

<sup>28</sup> *RRC* 477–9; Lowe 2002, 77–82, pl.2–5.

<sup>29</sup> *Pietas* or cognates appear in the Thirteenth Philippic at 13.37; 42; 43 (x4); 46 (x2); 47. *Impietas* or cognates at 13.1 and 43. *Impii ciues* or a related idea occurs frequently throughout the fourteen speeches, with only *Philippics* 7, 9 and 10 lacking examples.

Cicero asked whether Antonius wanted the (truly) *pious* Lepidus to be considered (like him) *impious* (*Phil.* 13.43). He then added ‘And furthermore, you seek not just the *pious* but the *piissimi*, importing a new word which does not exist in the Latin language to gratify *tua diuina pietas*’. The phrase is another ironic borrowing from Antonius’ own rhetoric, which had set up not only Lepidus but himself and his brother as leading players in the race to avenge the Dictator. Antonius’ neologism, if it was that, suggests a competition in *pietas* which Cicero claimed Latin had not previously encountered.<sup>30</sup> With whom were the Antonii and Lepidus competing? In the first place, Pompeius himself, who had put the cognomen on his coinage. In the second place, the young Caesar who had sworn to the troops that he would be worthy of his father and who had then done a deal with Cicero.<sup>31</sup> Cicero responds by suggesting that the young Caesar’s *singularis pietas* will not prevent his accepting the alliance with his father’s murderers.<sup>32</sup> This Caesar, says Cicero, understands that *maxima pietas* is *pietas erga patriam* (*Phil.* 13.46):

quo maior adulescens Caesar, maioreque deorum immortalium beneficio rei publicae natus est, qui nulla specie paterni nominis nec pietate abductus umquam est et intellegit maximam pietatem conseruatione patriae contineri.

So much the greater is young Caesar, so much the greater the gift of the immortal gods who gave him to the *res publica*, for he has never been led astray by the show of his father’s name or by filial *pietas*, and he understands that greatest *pietas* lies in the preservation of the *patria*. (Bailey, Manuwald, Ramsey adapted)

Cicero has shifted the terms of the competition. His emphasis is on ‘greatest *pietas*’, suggesting a hierarchy of duties, whereas Antonius claimed that Lepidus was the most *pious* of men (with himself, one should understand, not far behind). In Antonius’ view the prosecution of the Dictator’s murderers was the main duty of *pietas* and the winner of the

---

<sup>30</sup>One reading for the difficult line 23 of Catullus 29.23 suggests ‘o piissimi’ but the text is normally emended to ‘opulentissime’ (Minyard 1971, 174). Were the text actually ‘piissimi’, the poem would reflect sentiments very close to Cicero’s at this point of the Philippics. I thank Paul Roche for alerting me to this possibility.

<sup>31</sup> *Att.* 16.15[426].3; Stone 2008, 224.

<sup>32</sup> At *Phil.* 5.50–51 Cicero pledged his word that the young Caesar would not seek revenge but would instead liberate D. Brutus in spite of his *domesticus dolor*. Welch 2002, 20; Manuwald 2007, 722–3; Stone 2008, 226.

competition would be he who did the most to bring this about. Cicero disagreed: the *patria* was supreme and all other forms of *pietas*, including avenging the death of a father, were subject to it. Cicero recognises the young Caesar's right but praises him for abrogating it in favour of the greater good.

As Antonius knew well, the young Caesar, who owed everything to his name, *was* profoundly aware of his father's position and the desires and expectations of the veterans (*Phil.* 13.25; *Att.* 16.15[426].3). The gravitational pull of Antonius' manifesto was enormous, especially on the soldiers. In his letter, Antonius had cast the very idea of Caesarians being allied to their enemies as a ghastly and unnatural victory for the dead Pompeius and his living son and had reminded them of the unpopularity of their choice of ally (*Phil.* 13.34; 38):<sup>33</sup>

‘Denique quid non aut probastis aut fecistis quod faciat, si reuiuiscat— Cn. Pompeius ipse— aut filius eius, si modo possit? Postremo negatis pacem fieri posse, nisi aut emisero Brutum aut frumento iuero. Quid? Hoc placetne ueteranis istis quibus adhuc omnia integra sunt, —

Quam ob rem uos potius animadvertite utrum sit elegantius et partibus utilius Treboni mortem persequi an Caesaris, et utrum sit aequius concurrere nos quo facilius reuiuiscat Pompeianorum causa totiens iugulata an consentire ne ludibrio simus inimicis—’

‘To sum up, what have you not approved or done which, if he came back to life, would not be done by— Gnaeus Pompeius himself— or his son, if he but had the power? — Finally, you say peace cannot be made, unless I let Brutus go or assist him with grain. Well, does this policy please veterans in your army who as yet are still quite free to choose,—...

On this account, you should rather reconsider whether it is more attractive and more appropriate for our side to avenge the death of Trebonius or Caesar and whether it is fairer to attack me so that the cause of the Pompeiani, strangled so many times, can more easily revivify or to work together and thus ensure that we are not a laughing stock for our enemies.’ (Bailey, Manuwald, Ramsey, adapted)

Antonius' strategy is to paint the picture of the personal satisfaction afforded to two generations of the gens Pompeia at seeing their Caesarian enemies at each others' throats. He

---

<sup>33</sup> Frisch (1946, 248) perceptively calls his chapter dealing with the Thirteenth Philippic ‘The Pompeians Rally’. However, he has little to say on the specifics of the Pompeian nature of Antonius' attack and even less on Sextus Pompeius himself.

thus highlights a fundamental problem for Cicero. To date, Sextus Pompeius' famous *pietas* looked uncomfortably like that which Antonius himself was promulgating and from which the young Caesar was to be exonerated: *pietas erga parentem* or in Antonius' case *parentem patriae*.<sup>34</sup> By refusing to go to Mutina, where he would have been required to make peace with the young Caesar, Pompeius had not only allowed his courage to be called into question; he had disqualified himself from Cicero's *pietas* competition. By highlighting his safer (and more civic) virtues of *temperantia* and *iustitia*, Cicero can allow himself a measure of enthusiasm as the new atmosphere required and as Pompeius' declaration of support was deemed to warrant. The terms are carefully chosen to meet a specific set of circumstances and to paper over the cracks.

How did Pompeius view the situation? He was not only a player with considerable military resources at his disposal; he had important allies in Rome, the most significant of whom was his father-in-law L. Scribonius Libo.<sup>35</sup> We should not forget him or the real 'Pompeiani' such as L. Luceius and M. Terentius Varro, still active in Rome and soon to be proscribed, even though our sources tell us nothing of their activities.<sup>36</sup> In my own view it was to these men as well as to the supporters of M. Brutus that Cicero was chiefly speaking when he attacked the wisdom of the cautious at *Phil.* 13.6. Pompeius had firmly stated to the ambassadors that he was on the side of the *res publica*. However, perhaps he, like Brutus, thought that Cicero's strategy was too risky. There is slight evidence that Libo thought so. Following the policy meeting in December 44, at which Libo was present, Cicero launched into a frantic exhortation to Decimus Brutus to sit tight in Cisalpine Gaul (*Fam.* 11.7[354].2):

Caput autem est hoc, quod te diligentissime percipere et meminisse uolam.

---

<sup>34</sup> Welch 2002, 19–20.

<sup>35</sup> *Att.* 16.4[411].1–2; Hadas 1930, 59–62; Welch 2002, 51–53.

<sup>36</sup> Luceius had been active in attempting to entice Cicero back to public life in 45, calling on him in stern terms not to abandon himself to grief (*Fam.* 5.15[252]). Caesar describes Luceius as part of the elder Pompeius' innermost circle (*BC* 3.18), a picture corroborated by Cicero (*Att.* 9.11[178].3). On his probable proscription see Hinard 1985, 488–490. Varro's proscription is beyond doubt (Hinard 1985, 526). For an argument that his *Pius aut de pace*, mentioned only by Aulus Gellius, treated Sextus Pompeius and the treaty at Misenum, see Katz 1985. On the literary men who were close to Pompeius, see Anderson 1968.

The most important thing *I would want* you to understand and remember is this!

He implies that others at that meeting might have preferred Brutus to do otherwise. For M. Brutus and Cassius and perhaps Pompeius and his friends, the young Caesar posed as much of a problem as Antonius. They had considerable fear, and not without foundation, of Cicero's bright young protégé and the strategy which depended on the assistance of his veterans.

Cicero and the assassins were united in their belief that the *res publica* was in need of defence but not at all in their views on how to achieve it (*AdBr.* 2.5[5]). His decision to accept the offer of alliance with the young Caesar, made with such careful thought, had nonetheless thrown the Republican faction into some confusion, though none of them could admit it in public.<sup>37</sup> As the year progressed, Cicero desperately wanted M. Brutus and Cassius to come back to Italy with troops but at no stage did either show any sign of doing so.<sup>38</sup> Cicero had determined that Antonius was the chief enemy and that he must be confronted on the battlefield; Brutus did nothing which could irrevocably bar the way to future negotiations and even embarrassed Cicero by continuing to address Antonius as a magistrate (*AdBr.* 2.5[5].3). Cicero entreated D. Brutus to stay where he was; M. Brutus and others might have preferred him to retreat to the safety of Macedonia. Cicero's Rome-based alliance was important to the assassins, especially because it had secured them a reprieve from Antonius' provincial arrangements of 27 November 44. They also needed to protect D. Brutus since he had decided to withstand Antonius' attack. However, neither M. Brutus in the East or Sextus Pompeius in the West would commit to a campaign which could disintegrate at any point and which involved putting themselves at the mercy of Caesar Octavianus. They could only hope that Cicero could make it work.

---

<sup>37</sup> App. *BC* 3.61; 82. M. Brutus' disquiet is clear even from those letters universally regarded as genuine: *AdBr.* 2.5[5].2 (14 Apr 43); 1.4[10].3 (7 May); 1.4a[11].2 (15 May); 1.10[17].3-4. For a recent (and strong) defence of M. Brutus' authorship of letters 25 and 26 in Bailey's numbering see Moles 1997.

<sup>38</sup> *Ad Br.* 1.10[17].1; 5; 1.9[18].3; 1.12[21].2; 1.14[22].2. Around 1 April, M. Brutus requested troops from Cicero, suggesting he was determined to stay where he was (*AdBr.* 2.3[2]5; 2.4[4].4).

Throughout April 43, the events around Mutina took their course. Antonius was eventually defeated and escaped; by the end of April, Hirtius and Pansa were dead (*Fam.* 11.9[380].1). Suddenly even Cicero had to admit that the young Caesar was getting harder to manage and increasingly unreliable.<sup>39</sup> Before the whole edifice collapsed, Cicero was able to engineer a new push to give Cassius charge of the war in Syria and on 27 April he succeeded in ensuring that a special vote of *maius imperium* was attached to the command (*AdBr.* 1.5[9].1). The war was moving out of Italy and into the provinces which is what M. Brutus, Cassius and, I suggest, the friends of Pompeius, had been planning in the event of the collapse of the Ciceronian strategy. Dio links Pompeius' naval command to the confirmation of both M. Brutus and Cassius' position, leading scholars to believe that all three commands were assigned together (46.40.3):

τῷ τε γὰρ Πομπηίῳ τῷ Σέξτῳ τὸ ναυτικὸν καὶ τῷ Βρούτῳ τῷ Μάρκῳ τὴν Μακεδονίαν τῷ τε Κασσίῳ τὴν τε Συρίαν καὶ τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς τὸν Δολοβέλλαν ἐνεχείρισαν.

Thus to Sextus Pompeius they entrusted the fleet, to Marcus Brutus Macedonia, and to Cassius Syria together with the war against Dolabella.

The Senate had finally conferred an office, that of *praefectus classis et orae maritimae*, on Pompeius.<sup>40</sup> In doing so, it acknowledged him as a member of a three-pronged team fighting for the *res publica*. The command also denotes the open recognition of the navy as a central part of the Republican strategy. Cicero never mentions Pompeius' prefecture. For that, we need a different source tradition. Appian's 'Cassius' can speak about Pompeius' command as

<sup>39</sup> *Fam.* 10.11[382].3 (Plancus, c. 1 May); 11.10[385].2 (D. Brutus 5 May); 11.13[388].1 (D. Brutus c. 9 May); 11.19[399].1 (D. Brutus 21 May); 11.20[401].1 (D. Brutus 24 May); 10.24[428].5–7 Plancus 28 July).

<sup>40</sup> Hadas 1930, 65–66; Woodman 1983, 177–178; Welch 2002, 1–3; Drum 2003, 216–218; *RRC* 511; Vell. 2.73.2 (contrast L. Staius Murcus at 2.72.4); App. *BC* 3.4 (wrongly placing the award of the command in early 44): εἶναι δὲ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἤδη τῆς θαλάσσης, καθὼς ἦν καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῖς Ῥωμαίων ναυσὶν αὐτίκα ταῖς πανταχοῦ χρῆσθαι εἰς τὰ ἐπείγοντα (and be appointed commander of the sea, as his father had been, with charge of all the Roman ships, wherever situated, which were needed for immediate service); and 4.84 (placed more correctly in 43). *Praefectus classis* = Miltner, *RE* 22.1.1294–1301; Saddington (1988, 305) lists Pompeius as first of his naval *praefecti*. I have previously argued that the uniqueness of the title as a sign of the need for a special accommodation for Pompeius. In the light of my research into the use of the naval strategy of 49 and onwards, I have here refined this view, although the separation between Pompeius and Cicero is still a significant factor (see Welch 2002, 1).

integrated with the defence at Philippi (*BC* 4.94) and Dio states that later, when Cicero's alliance had shattered, the Senate exhorted Pompeius, along with M. Brutus and Cassius, to move against Antonius and Lepidus.<sup>41</sup> Even more evocatively, the elder Seneca has Varius Geminus take both sides in the debate on whether Cicero should have denounced his Philippics and saved his life. He is most famous for a pithy indictment of all three men (*Suas.* 6.14).

adiecit quocumque peruenisset ... ferendam esse aut Cassii uiolentiam aut Bruti superbiam aut Pompei stultitiam.

Wherever he had gone [Cicero] ... would have had to tolerate either the violence of Cassius, the arrogance of Brutus or the stupidity of Pompeius.

He had previously (and less famously) argued that Cicero should have escaped to fight another day (*Suas.* 6.11):

adhortatus est illum ad fugam: illic esse M. Brutum, illic C. Cassium, illic Sex. Pompeium. et adiecit illam sententiam, quam Cassius Seuerus unice mirabatur: quid deficiemus? et res publica suos triumuiros habet.

[Varius] urged him to flee as Brutus, Cassius and Sextus Pompeius had done. And he added that saying which was particularly admired by Cassius Severus: 'Why despair? The *res publica* also has its Triumvirs'.

In making both cases, Geminus links the three men as leaders of the Republican side, alerting us to Pompeius' reintegration. The reference to the fame of the *sententia* and its admirer Cassius Severus suggest that its original context belongs to the outbreak of the proscriptions in early 42 or soon after. Pompeius' appointment to the prefecture of the fleet coincided with a surge of naval activity in the East and notice of Cassius' intention to resurrect the strategy of fighting their enemies by deploying their logistical superiority and avoiding open confrontation.<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>41</sup> Dio 46.51.5. The notice is placed after the Pedian law had formally convicted all three for perpetrating or supporting the murder of Caesar (Dio 46.48.2–4). Although this is almost certainly wrongly placed, the point is not the historical accuracy of this particular notice but the reference to Pompeius as constant.

<sup>42</sup> *Fam.* 12.14[405]; 12.15[406]; 12.13[419].3; Dio 47.30.4–7.

In early May 43, Cicero hints at another task which was expected of the allied provincial commanders. They could provide him and others with refuge if things got untenable in Italy (*AdBr.* 1.5[9].2). With events much more in flux than he was long prepared to admit, the thought of a strong fleet in western waters and close to Italy would have been a comfort to Cicero and any others who could see that Antonius would survive and return to Italy to seek revenge on his enemies. In his efforts to save the proscribed, Pompeius was finally able to lay claim to the virtue of *pietas erga patriam* and it was freely acknowledged by the many men who returned to Rome as a result of the Treaty of Misenum in 39BC. As rescuer of Roman citizens and commander of the Republicans in Sicily, Pompeius was placed not on the periphery but at the centre of Republican strategy. That Cicero tells us little is entirely consistent with his general attitude to Pompeius and his preferred strategy for fighting the war. His focus (which is followed by our major narrative sources) was firmly on Italy and Cisalpine Gaul. It extended to the welfare of M. Brutus and Cassius but no further.<sup>43</sup>

Within the framework of the 13<sup>th</sup> Philippic, we see that Cicero has consciously reworked *pietas* to combat the onslaught of Antonius' rhetoric. In the early months of 42, Sextus Pompeius had to (and did) reclaim a virtue he had made his own. His coinage celebrates his sense of duty towards the elder Pompeius. He also claims the oak leaf crown for saving the lives of citizens, who flocked to his new camp in Sicily during the proscriptions of 42 (*RRC* 511). In actively resisting the Triumvirate, he forged a reputation for *pietas erga patriam* to the point where not even his fiercest detractors could deny it to him.<sup>44</sup> Cicero's Thirteenth Philippic pinpoints the moment when this new meaning of *pietas* enters the vocabulary. It also allows us to track Cicero's reaction to Pompeius at a vital moment. Scholars have

---

<sup>43</sup> The anonymous reviewer of this article suggested that Cicero misjudged the attitude of many contemporary provincial governors, citing the cases of Pollio in Spain (*Fam.* 10.31[368].4) and L. Munatius Plancus. In my own view he was all too well aware of Pollio's attitude, which, despite all his protestations, leaned heavily in Antonius' direction. Plancus is more difficult. He protected Decimus Brutus until the Lex Pedia had been passed (*Vell.* 2.63.3; *App. BC* 3.96; *Dio* 46.53) and was the last to yield to Caesar Octavianus in late 43. He also tried to warn Cicero about the double game Caesar's heir had been playing (*Fam.* 10.24[428].5).

<sup>44</sup> *Vell.* 2.77.2: id unum tantummodo salutare aduentu suo patriae attulit quod omnibus proscriptis aliisque qui ad eum ex diuersis causis fugerant reditum salutemque pactus est. (There was only one benefit which he rendered to his country by attending, namely that all the proscripts and others who had fled to him for various reasons were guaranteed a safe return). For a similar sentiment, see *App. BC.* 5.143.

suggested that our limited knowledge of Sextus Pompeius is due to the efforts of the Augustan writers who followed the official lead set by the future *princeps* in his *res gestae* (RG 25.1). It is my view that this ‘erasure’ owes as much to Cicero’s determination to control Republican strategy in 43 as it does to the antipathy of a later age.

### **Acknowledgements**

This paper has been taken from a monograph-length study of Sextus Pompeius and his role in the history of opposition to Caesar and his heirs. The chapter from which it is drawn reconstructs the narrative of 44 until 42 by synchronising the activities of the assassins and other Republican military leaders with the events in Italy which our sources frequently relate in advance of any information on what was happening in the wider Mediterranean. Without committing any of them to agreement with my conclusions, I would like to thank Martin Stone, John Ramsey, Paul Roche, Kit Morrell, Andrew Wright and Roger Pitcher for many helpful conversations on this topic and observations on the written text. Thanks are also due to John Ramsey for providing me with a copy of the new Loeb text and translation of the 13<sup>th</sup> Philippic in advance of publication and to the ASCS reviewer for timely corrections to the final draft and many helpful suggestions. Cicero’s letters are cited using the standard form. Shackleton Bailey’s numbering has been supplied in square brackets. All dates are BC unless stated.

### **Bibliography**

#### **Editions and Translations:**

Bailey, D.R. Shackleton (ed)

1967 *Cicero: Letters to Atticus*. 6 vols. Cambridge.

1977 *Cicero: Epistulae ad Familiares*. 2 vols. Cambridge.

1980 *Cicero: Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem et M. Brutum*. Cambridge.

1986 *Cicero: Philippics*. Chapel Hill.

Bailey, D.R. Shackleton

2001 *Cicero: Letters to Friends*. 4 vols. Loeb Classical Library.

Bailey, D.R. Shackleton, Manuwald G, Ramsey J.

2009 *Cicero: Orations. Philippics 1–14*. 2 vols. Loeb Classical Library.

Carter, J.

1996 *Appian: the Civil Wars*. London.

Cary, E.

1917 *Dio’s Roman History*. vols. 4–5.

Magnino, D.  
1998 *Appiani Bellorum Civilium Liber Quartus*. Como.

Manuwald, G.  
2007 *Cicero: Philippics 3–9*. 2 vols. Berlin.

Shipley, F.W.  
1955 *Velleius Paterculus; Res Gestae Divi Augustus*. Loeb Classical Library.

White, H.  
1913 *Appian: Roman History*. vols 3–4. Loeb Classical Library.

Winterbottom, M.  
1974 *The Elder Seneca: Controversiae VII–X Suasoriae*. Loeb Classical Library.

Woodman, A.J.  
1983 *Velleius Paterculus: the Caesarian and Augustan narrative*. Cambridge.

#### **Abbreviations:**

##### *MRR*

Broughton, T.R.S.  
1952 *Magistrates of the Roman Republic*. 2 vols. New York.  
1986 *Magistrates of the Roman Republic* (Treggiari S. ed.). Atlanta.

##### *RRC*

Crawford, M.  
1974 *Roman Republican Coinage*. 2 vols Cambridge. (catalogue number).

#### **Cited Works**

Anderson, W.  
1963 *Pompey, his friends, and the literature of the First Century BC*. Berkeley.

Drum, M.  
2003 *Roman provincial magistrates and legates: from the death of Caesar to Philippi: 44–42 B.C.* Doctoral Thesis, University of Western Australia, Perth.  
2008 'Cicero's Tenth and Eleventh Philippic: the Republicans advance in the East' in Stevenson & Wilson *Cicero's Philippics*. Auckland, 82–94.

Frisch, H.  
1946 *Cicero's fight for the Republic*. Copenhagen.

Hadas, M.  
1930 *Sextus Pompey*. New York.

Hinard, F.

1985 *Les proscriptions de la Rome républicaine*. Rome.

Katz, B.

1985 'Varro, Sallust and the *Pius aut de pace*', *C&M* 36, 127–158.

Kromayer, J.

1897 'Die Entwicklung der römischen Flotte vom Seeräuberriege des Pompeius bis zur Schlacht von Actium', *Philologus* 56, 426–91.

Lowe B.J.

2002 'Sextus Pompeius and Spain 46–44BC' in Powell & Welch, *Sextus Pompeius*, 64–102.

Miltner F.

1952 S. Pompeius Magnus [33] in Pauly–Wissowa *Real–Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* vol 21.2; col. 2213–50. Stuttgart.

Minyard J.D.

1971 'Critical Notes on Catullus 29', *CPh* 76, 174–181.

Moles J.L.

1997 'Plutarch, Brutus and Brutus' Greek and Latin letters', in J. Mossman (ed.) *Plutarch and his Intellectual World*. London, 141–168

Powell A. & Welch K. (eds)

2002 *Sextus Pompeius*. Swansea.

Ramsey J.T.

2001 'Did Mark Antony contemplate an alliance with his political enemies in July 44' *CPh* 96, 253–268.

2009 'Debate at a Distance: A Unique Rhetorical Strategy in Cicero's Thirteenth Philippic' in D. H. Berry and Andrew Erskine (eds) *Form and Function in Roman Oratory*. Cambridge.

Saddington, D.B.

1988 '*Praefecti classis, orae maritimae* and *ripae* of the Second Triumvirate and the Early Empire', *JRGZ* 35, 299–313.

Steel, C.

2008 'Finessing failure: the sixth Philippic' in Stevenson and Wilson *Cicero's Philippics*. Auckland, 237–242.

Stevenson, T. & Wilson, M. (eds)

2008 *Cicero's Philippics: history, rhetoric, ideology*. Auckland.

Stone, A.M.

2008 'Greek Ethics and Roman Statesmen' in Stevenson and Wilson *Cicero's Philippics*. Auckland, 214–239.

Syme, R.

1939 *The Roman Revolution*. Oxford.

Wallace Hadrill, A.

1981 'The Emperor and His Virtues', *Historia* 30, 298–323.

Welch, Kathryn

2002 'Both Sides of the Coin: Sextus Pompeius and the so-called Pompeiani' and 'Sextus Pompeius and the *res publica*' in Powell & Welch, *Sextus Pompeius*, 1–63

2009 'Alternative Memoirs: tales from the 'other side' of the civil war' in Smith, C.J. & Powell, Anton (eds) *The Lost Memoirs of Augustus*. Swansea 2009, 195–224.

(forthcoming) *Magnus Pius: Sextus Pompeius and the Transformation of the Roman Republic*. Swansea.