Thucydides 1.99: Tribute and Revolts in the Athenian Empire

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This paper is a contribution to recent discussions of the history and character of the Athenian empire. In what follows I want to test Thucydides’ generalizations about tribute and revolts in 1.99 against his own evidence and the evidence which is available from other sources. To anticipate my conclusion the evidence from all sources does not, for the most part, substantiate Thucydides. 1.99 reads:

[1] Of all the causes of revolts (‘disaffection’; ton apostaseon) the main ones were their failure to pay the tribute (‘contributions’; phoros) or to provide ships; for the Athenians were exacting, and made themselves offensive by applying the screw of necessity to men who were not used to and in fact not disposed for any continuous labour. [2] In some other respects the Athenians were not the old popular rulers they had once been at first; and if they had more than their fair share of service, it was correspondingly easy for them to reduce any that tried to leave the confederacy. [3] For this the allies had themselves to blame; the wish to get off service making most of them arrange to pay their share of the expense in money instead of in ships, and so to avoid having to leave their homes. Thus while Athens

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1 See especially Low (2005, 2008), Ma et al. (2009) and Morris (2009). The seminal starting points are still de Ste. Croix (1954) and Meiggs (1972). At 1.97.2 Thuc. uses the designation tes arches…ton Athenaion. Some English speaking scholars, such as Hansen & Nielsen (2004) use the designation Delian League because the meeting place of the alliance was held at the temple of Apollo at Delos. The treasury of the alliance was also located at Delos (1.96.2). The choice of designation can imply different judgements of the Athenian arche but can also simply be descriptive and neutral. It is this latter sense that both the designations, Delian League and Athenian empire, are used here. See also de Ste. Croix (1954) and the typology of empires given by Finley (1978). The arche of the Athenians fits, to a greater or lesser degree, within the categories enumerated by Finley. Most recently see Morris (2009:128-30), who, in a radical re-examination of the Athenian empire, proposes the designation, ‘the Greater Athenian State’.

2 ‘No systematic analysis of the revolts in the ancient empires exists.’ Finley (1978:14). Finley clearly meant Greece and Rome, and for Greece, and specifically for the Athenian empire, the situation has not changed in over thirty years. This paper is based, in part, on my ‘Revolts in the Athenian Empire: A Checklist’ (forthcoming).

3 Cf. Thuc. 1.19: ‘The policy of Sparta was not to exact tribute (phoros) from her allies but merely to secure their subservience to her interests by establishing oligarchies among them; Athens, on the contrary, had by degrees deprived hers of their ships, and imposed instead contributions of money on all except Chios and Lesbos.’ On oligarchy and revolt see my comments on stasis below. At 1.18.3 Thuc. writes of the Athenian war with her ‘own revolted allies’ (tois heauton xummachois aphistamenois).

4 Professor Harold Tarrant has put it to me that the sense of ‘that which is brought in’ or ‘contribution’ better captures what was happening during the early decades of the Delian League when contributors saw themselves sharing voluntarily in the funding and military operations. In this context one may note the title of the Festschrift for Malcolm McGregor – Classical Contributions (1981). This volume contains the overlooked paper by Woodhead (1981) ‘The Founding Fathers of the Delian Confederacy’ which is relevant in this context.
was increasing her navy with the funds which they contributed, ‘when they revolted they always found themselves inadequately armed and inexperienced in war.’

Here Thucydides makes several statements about the nexus between revolts and tribute (phoros) during the period of the Athenian empire (478/7 to 404 BC). This passage is to be found in the digression on the Pentekontaetia (478/7 - 432/1 BC) in which Thucydides gives only a limited number of examples of revolts for this period: Naxos (1.98.4; ca. 470 BC; CPCInv.507), Thasos (1.100.2; 101.3; 465 BC; CPCInv.526), Euboia where he does not name the nine Euboian poleis separately. (1.114.1; 446 BC). Samos (1.115 - 117.3; 441/0 – 439 BC; CPCInv.864), and Byzantion (1.115.5; 117.3; 441/40 - 439 BC; CPCInv.674). None of these is specifically linked to tribute. At 1.98.4 Thucydides writes:

After this Naxos left the confederacy (apostasi), and war ensued, and she had to return after a siege; this was the first instance of the confederation being forced to subjugate an allied city (polis xummachis), a precedent which was followed by that of the rest in the order which circumstances prescribed.

Despite the potential significance of establishing a direct causal relationship between tribute and revolts, and establishing that revolts were common and widespread over a period of more than seventy years, Thucydides has remarkably little to say about tribute. There are only 17 uses of phoros in Thucydides: 7 in Book 1, plus, of the

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6 Cf. 1.18.3.

7 Dates where not indicated are BC.

8 1.98 also names three poleis previously held by the Persians which were captured by Kimon and the Athenians during the 470’s – Eion in Thrace (CPCInv.630), the island of Skyros (CPCInv.521) and Karystos in Euboia (CPCInv. 373). Eion became an Athenian fortified naval base on the Strymon river (Thuc. 4.107.2), Skyros became a non-tributary member of the Delian League (CPCInv. 1.356) and Karystos became a tributary member.

9 For CPCInv. see abbreviations in the Bibliography.

10 The nine poleis are Chalkis (CPCInv.365 with IG 1³ 40, ML 52, ATEPW 103), Eretria (CPCInv.370 with IG 1³ 39, ATEPW 102), Hestiaia (CPCInv.372 with IG 1³ 41), Karystos (CPCInv.373), Grychnai (CPCInv.371), Diakrion en Euboia (CPCInv.366), Diakres apo Chalkideon (CPCInv.367), Posideon en Euboia (CPCInv.376); and Styra (CPCInv.377). Megara (CPCInv.225), which is also named as having revolted, was not a tributary ally of Athens. The revolts in Euboia were almost certainly in 446 and not in 424/3 as some imply from Philochorus FGrHist 328, F119. For further references see ATEPW 102 and 103.

11 Both Plato, Letters 7.332bc and Lysias 2.55 refer to the duration of the Athenian arche as 70 years. Thuc. 1.99 is followed closely by Plutarch, Kimon 11.1.

12 Thucydides makes the following references to phoros: 1.19, 56.2, 66, 80.3, 96.2, 99, 108.4; 2.13.3, 97.3 (payments made to the Odrysian empire); 3.50.2; 4.57.4; 5.18.5; 7.28.4, 57.4 (kai ton men hypekooi kai phorou hypotelon. Thucydides here establishes a direct correlation between tribute paying and subject status. Cf. 2.41.3), 57.5; 8.5.5 (Persian phoros; Tissaphernes was in arrears in his payments to Ataxerxes), 5.6
remaining 10, 3 relate to tribute paid to the Odrysians (1) or to Persia (2). Of more concern is the failure of Thucydides to include any reference to events and details relating to tribute\textsuperscript{13} where, if tribute was as significant as Thucydides implies in 1.19 and 1.99, we might expect to find them. Missing is any mention of details relating to the process of the assessment and collection of tribute. There is nothing about the transfer of the League treasury from Delos to Athens, presumably in 454.\textsuperscript{14} There is nothing about the payment of a quota (aparche) of one sixtieth (1.67\%) from the tribute to Athena on the Acropolis.\textsuperscript{15} These aparchai were recorded on the Tribute Quota Lists, parts of which survive.\textsuperscript{16} There is nothing about the impact of this change upon the nature of the Delian League. There is nothing about the quadrennial assessments of tribute or of the extraordinary reassessment of 425/4 during the Archidamian war (IG 1\textsuperscript{1} 71; ML 69; ATEPW 136). We do however learn something of importance from a clause in the Peace of Nikias of 422/1 where we read that ‘the cities shall be independent (autonomous; 5.17.5) paying only the tribute of Aristeides’. This confirms that Aristeides assessed the original tribute. This important detail is supported by the Athenaión Politeía attributed to Aristotle (Ath. 

\textsuperscript{13} For details about the administration and collection of tribute we first need to turn to the epigraphical evidence: IG 1\textsuperscript{1} 34 (MI 46, ATEPW 98; either 448/7 or, more likely, 426/5), IG 1\textsuperscript{1} 68 (ML 68, ATEPW 133; 426), IG 1\textsuperscript{1} 60 (a fragmentary decree about tribute; c.a. 430) and IG 1\textsuperscript{1} 71 (ML 69, ATEPW 136; 425/4). The fragments of two speeches by Antiphon F 25-33 Thalheim (\textit{On the Tribute of Lindos} [Rhodes]) and F 49-56 Thalheim (\textit{On the Tribute of Samothrace}) make it clear that poleis could appeal against their tribute assessment; cf. IG 1\textsuperscript{1} 40 lines 25-27 (ML 52; ATEPW 103; 446/5): ‘I shall pay the tribute to the Athenians which I persuade them (to assess)’; Meiggs (1972:240-1). See also Isocrates 8.82 on the display of tribute at the Dionysia with Meiggs (1972:253-4 & 433-4). On all matters to do with the tribute and the finances of the Athenian empire see Samons (2000) and Figueira (2005).

\textsuperscript{14} See now the archon’s name (Aristonos) in the prescript of the of the First Tribute Quota List (IG 1\textsuperscript{1} 259 line 3; ATEPW 85: Ariston was Archon in 454/3). However see Pritchett (1969) who refers to the fragment of Theophrastos to be found in Plut. Aристидес 25 (cf. \textit{Perikles} 12), which states that the proposal for the transfer of the treasury was made by the Samians. The context would imply that this proposal was made, although not necessarily implemented, before the demise and death of Aristides, probably in the early 460’s; see Plut. Aристидес 26 with Krateros \textit{FGHist} 342, F 12. For omissions in Thucydides’ account of the Penecontaetia see Gomme \textit{HCT} 1.365-70.

\textsuperscript{15} For the Tribute Quota Lists see IG 1\textsuperscript{1} 259-90. These were edited by two of the original editors of \textit{ATL}, B.D. Meritt and M.F. McGregor with Meritt reproducing his own readings in IG 1\textsuperscript{1}. A new edition, with conservative restorations, is being prepared by Bjorn Paarmann. See \textit{Current Epigraphy} 8 May 2007 – www.currentepigraphy.org/2007/05/08/new-edition-of-the-Athenian-tribute-lists/

\textsuperscript{16} The reliability and usefulness of the Tribute Quota Lists is rightly queried by Pritchett (1964:134) and Rhodes (1985:1-2) with the former writing: ‘\textit{ATL} is an elaborate façade, like that of the cathedral of Milan, full of rich detail, impressive in scale, but giving little idea of the basic structure behind.’ On the problems of dating and the restoration of Athenian inscriptions see Mattingly (1996), Stroud (2006) and Rhodes (2008).
Pol. 23.5; cf. Plut. Aristeides 24.1; Diodorus Siculus 11.46.4 – 47.2.\textsuperscript{17} It also establishes that paying tribute was not considered to be incompatible with \textit{autonomia} in either 477 or 421.\textsuperscript{18}

From Thucydides 7.28.4 we learn the important fact that, because of the losses and financial distress caused by the war in Sicily and by the Spartans in their occupation of Dekeleia, instead of tribute, a tax of 5\% upon all imports and exports by sea (throughout the empire?)\textsuperscript{19} was introduced in the summer of 413 ‘which they thought would raise more money for them.’ It is interesting to note that even at a time when Athens was engaged in a major campaign in the west it was thought that import and export taxes were a better option than tribute. Given the amounts raised by tribute compared with the costs involved in funding a large scale fleet\textsuperscript{20} of between 200 and 300 ships,\textsuperscript{21} 600 talents (see below) was not a very large sum. To put tribute in some perspective the siege of Poteidaia from 432-29 had cost the Athenians 2000 talents (2.13.3, 70.2). The cost of maintaining sixty ships at sea for eight months (Plut. \textit{Perikles} 11) would have been between 240 talents (at 3 obols per crewman per day) and 480 talents (at 1 drachma per day).\textsuperscript{22} The cost of the Parthenon which was built between 447/6 and 433/2 was about 600 talents\textsuperscript{23} and, on the basis of surviving accounts, Pheidias’ gold and ivory statue of Athena cost between 700 and 1000 talents.\textsuperscript{24}

It is left to Xenophon in his \textit{Hellenika} 1.3.9. to give us the evidence that tribute was resumed by at least 408: ‘… the Chalcedonians would pay the Athenian tribute they

\textsuperscript{17} Diodorus gives the original assessed tribute as 560 talents whereas Thucydides at 1.96.2 gives a figure of 460 talents.

\textsuperscript{18} On both \textit{autonomia}, and dependent \textit{poleis} see Hansen (2003; 269-70) theses 45-47 & \textit{CPCInv}. pp. 87-94, which posits a ‘Typology of Dependent \textit{Poleis}’. Type (8) is relevant here: ‘[a] \textit{polis} that is a member of a hegemonic league (\textit{symmachia}) which has developed in into an “empire” (\textit{arche}), e.g. the \textit{hypekooi poleis} in the Delian League.’

\textsuperscript{19} Thuc. does not make this clear. See Samons (2000:250-51) and Hornblower (2008: 594-6) on 7.28.4.

\textsuperscript{20} On the size of the force of both Athenians and allies in Sicily see Thuc. 7.57 with its reference to the ‘subjects paying tribute’ (\textit{kai ton men hyperkoon kai phorou hypotelon}). Not all of the forces of the Athenians were in the west. Although we have scant details we can note that Athens was able to lend some support to the revolt of Amorges (Thuc. 8.5.5; 19.2; 28.2-5; 54.3). \textit{IG I}^1 370 (ML 77) lines 61-81 contains references to payments made by the treasurers of Athena for the year 415/4 including to an operation by Telephonos (line 63; unknown) , to an occupation force on Melos (line 72), to an operation in the Thermaic Gulf (line 73, cf. Thuc.7.9) and to a general at Ephesos (line 79) as well as substantial payments of 300T and 4T 2000 dr. to the forces in Sicily.

\textsuperscript{21} 100 or 200 ships in 483/2 (Hdt. 7.144, 200 ships; \textit{Ath. Pol}. 22.7, 100 ships); 200 ships with their allies off Cyprus in 450 (Thuc. 1.112); 300 ships at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 (Thuc. 2.13.8; Xen. \textit{Anabasis} 7.1.27).

\textsuperscript{22} See Gabrielsen (1994:111) for rates of pay in the Athenian navy. Gabrielsen, who doubts the accuracy of Plutarch’s figures, does not make the calculation. The figures seem plausible to me.

\textsuperscript{23} Stanier (1953); \textit{IG I}^1 436-450; Giovannini (1990; 1997) argues that the tribute did not fund the Parthenon.

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{IG I}^1 453-460 with ML 54.
had been accustomed to paying previously and any arrears of payments owed. As early as 411 Xenophon (1.1.8) reports that Athenian ships sailed out from the Hellespont ‘in order to collect money’. Whether this was tribute or not is not certain. Nor is it certain just how long the tribute continued to be assessed and collected after 408. Aristophanes, *Frogs* 363 would seem to indicate that the 5% tax was still being levied in 405. During the last years of the Peloponnesian War Athens’ finances were far from secure. The Athenians twice had to levy a property tax (Lysias 21.3) and had to resort to the melting down of the golden Nikai dedications to Athena in order to produce an ‘emergency’ gold coinage. The Scholiast to Aristophanes *Frogs* 720, citing Hellanikos (FrGrHist 323a F 26) and Philochorus (FrGkHist 328 F 141) states that this occurred in the archonship of Antigenes (407/6).

We also learn from Thucydides at 1.96.2 that the first assessment in 478/7 was 460 talents. At 2.13.3 we are told that the average annual income from the tribute in 431 at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War was 600 talents. Given that at the outset of the Delian League many, perhaps most, allies contributed ships and that, according to Thucydides 1.99.3, over time most switched from ship contribution to *phoros*, an increase over 47 years of only 120 talents is not easy to explain. Unz and French have some suggestions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Income in Cash or Treasure</th>
<th>Contributors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) cash tribute (as assessed by Aristeides)</td>
<td>All the Delian allies except those contributing ships (2a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) fines</td>
<td>Recalcitrant allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) war indemnities</td>
<td>e.g. Samos after 439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) booty</td>
<td>Persian dominions, and rebellious allies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Income in Kind</th>
<th>Contributors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) ships attached to the league fleet each year, but remaining under the control of the contributing state</td>
<td>Athens, Chios, Lesbos, Samos (until 440)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) supplies delivered to allied forces in the field</td>
<td>Allied states in operational areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) ships and gear handed over to Athens and not returnable</td>
<td>Naxos, Thasos, Samos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of original ship contributors was, according to Blackman (1969), 9 *poleis* plus a further possible 23. Over time these had been whittled down to three: Chios (CPCInv.840), Samos (CPCInv.864) and the *poleis* of Lesbos of which there were five (Mytilene, CPCInv.798; Eresos, CPCInv.796; Methymna, CPCInv.797).

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25 Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.22: The Athenians established a customs house at Chalcedon in 410 and began to collect a 10% tax on all vessels sailing from the Black Sea. Whether this tax bears any relation to the 5% tax of 413 is not clear.

26 Diodorus Siculus 11.47.1 gives the figure as 560 talents. See above page 4 with note 17.

27 Untz (1984) argues, inter alia, that in the case of some of the larger *poleis* tribute payments were paid directly in the field. French (1971:85, above fig.1) includes a useful table that illustrates this possibility.

Antissa, *CPIInv*.794 and Pyrrha, *CPIInv*.799). The Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* (24.2) says that Athens used these as ‘guards of the empire (phylakas ...tes arches).’ Of the change from ship contributions to tribute paying which Thucydides implies was largely voluntary it could be said that tribute was a cheaper option. The evidence of the Tribute Quota Lists, although extremely fragmentary, would seem to support this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount of Tribute</th>
<th>No. of Payments</th>
<th>Amount of Tribute</th>
<th>No. of Payments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10-900 drachmas</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3 T 500 dr. – 4 T</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 dr.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>4 T 5600 dr. – 5 T</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1165 – 2000 dr.</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>5 T 200 dr. – 6 T</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000+ - 3000 dr.</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6 T 4000 dr. – 8 T</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3120 – 4000 dr.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8 T 2700 dr. – 9 T</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4320 – 5200 dr.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10 T – 10 T 1100 dr.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Talent</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>12 – 15 T</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 T 600 dr. – 2 T</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>16 – 21+ T</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2+ - 3 T</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>30+ T – 75 T</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** *ATL II, 122-24*

**Figure 2**

Of a total of 558 payments attested in the tribute lists from 454/3 to 415/14 (40 years; see fig.1 above)30 325, or 58%, were for payments of a talent or less including 62 payments of between a negligible 10 and 900 drachmas. There were 76 payments for 1000 drachmas, 48 for payments between 1165-2000 drachmas, and 45 for payments between 2000-3000 drachmas. 61 payments were for 1 talent. Of the 196 payments of between 1 talent and 10 talents and 1100 drachmas 62 were for payments of between 1-2 talents. Very high payments between 12-15 and up to 30 talents, account for only 37 payments or 6.5% of all extant payments with 13 payments higher than 13 talents. The highest payments ‘recorded’ are 30 talents for Aignina, Byzantion, Thasos and Paros. The highest figures proposed by the editors of *ATL* are 60 talents for Thasos and 75 talents for Abdera. These are both speculative restorations made in the reassessment decree of 425/4 (*IG I* 3 71).31 To put all these figures into some perspective we can note that the daily wages for unskilled and skilled labourers respectively during the latter part of the fifth century at Athens ranged between 3 and

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29 These figures are based on the ‘Index to Amounts of Tribute’ in *ATL II*. 122-4. Whilst the *IG I* 3 edition of the Athenian Tribute Quota Lists varies on some of the details this Index serves well for indicative purposes. See also the bar graphs in Nixon and Price (1990:142, fig.12: 166-70: ‘Sums paid in Tribute, as for 441 BC’) and in Osborne (2000:90-91, 93).

30 Hansen and Nielsen (2004: 1356-1360) list 330 members of the Delian League. These are mostly *poleis*. They list a further 6 members which are recorded by regional ethnic and 5 which are recorded by the name of a ruler. Many of these were not members for the full 70 years of the alliance. See also the tables of tribute in Meiggs (1972:538-661). Meiggs lists 236 tribute payers for the period 453-420.

31 *ATL A9* (425/4); *IG I* 3 col. III lines 153, 155; Meiggs (1972:571) Table III: Thraceward District, East of Strymon no.56 Thasos (*CPIInv*.526) and no.58 Abdera (*CPIInv*.640) s.v. A9.
6 obols (1/2 - 1 drachma). The daily wage for a rower in the Athenian fleet was probably 3 obols but this was increased for the Sicilian expedition of 415 to 1 drachma (Thuc. 6.31.3, 3.17.4, 6.8.1 cf. 8.45.2). This meant that a trireme could cost between half a talent (3000dr.) and one talent (6000dr.) to be kept at sea for a month. According to Morris ‘in the fifth century a trireme cost about a talent to build and rig and probably about another talent per month to support a crew of more than 180 men.’ On the basis of fourth century figures the cost to an Athenian triarch of funding, by liturgy, a trireme for one year, could be between 4000dr – 6000 dr. (Davies APF 1971: xxi-xxii). Indeed these figures are such as to suggest that the obligations of a polis could be funded by a liturgy performed by its wealthiest citizen(s). Several sources would seem to reinforce this likelihood. A fragment of Antiphon (F 51 Thalheim) from On the Tribute of Samothrace reads: ‘Those of us were appointed collectors (ekloges) who were reputed the wealthiest.’ The wealthy among the allies may well have been called upon to pay the tribute, or part of it, as a liturgy, or as Samons suggests ‘via the eisphora’. This may not have sat well with members of the wealthy elites who may have previously supplied and commanded their own ships.

We may also note that among ‘big end’ tribute contributors who paid up to 10 talents the savings over ship contribution were probably significant. Especially is this so when we compare known ship numbers against later tribute payments. For example, at the battle of Lade in 494, Herodotus (6.9) reports 80 ships for Miletos but its tribute only ever varied between 10 and 5 talents.

Despite the omissions noted above, Thucydides remains our main source for revolts, most of which, perhaps not surprisingly occur at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, during the Archidamian War, especially in northern Greece/Thrace, as a result of the campaigns of the Spartan general Brasidas (424-422; Thuc. 4.78 -86, 102-135; 5.1-11), and between 412 and 411 after the Athenian defeat in Sicily, but in the latter case not without some help from Athenian oligarchs and the Spartans who, with an expanded navy backed by Persian funding (8.57-8; 412/11), were now serious contenders to the supremacy of the Athenians at sea. Despite the extent of Thucydides’ accounts of revolts in these contexts, not once does he draw a clear connection between revolts and tribute in his narrative of individual revolts.

A more common occurrence in these accounts is the existence of stasis in the cities which revolted where factions which were either democratic and pro-Athenian or oligarchic and pro-Spartan and/or pro Persian, played a significant role. Hansen, the director of the Copenhagen Polis Centre, in his 2003 article, ‘95 Theses about the Greek Polis in the Archaic and Classical Periods’, advances four theses about stasis,

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32 See for example the Erechtheion Accounts, IG I1 474-479 (409/8 – ca. 406); Loomis (1998) is indispensable.
33 See above note 22.
35 Meiggs (1972:241).
37 CPCInv. pp.361-2 includes an index of poleis for which there is attested evidence of stasis. Many were members of the Delian League. Note also Thuc.1.19 where Thucydides states that Sparta took a pro-active role in establishing oligarchies. See above note 3.
the first of which (51) reads in part: ‘Our investigations support those historians who argue that most poleis were split up into what in the sources is called two opposing poleis, i.e. two factions among the citizens. The two opposing factions were often one of the rich (supporting oligarchy) and one of the poor (supporting democracy).’

In the fourth century, but looking back to the fifth, Aristotle, discussing stasis, wrote:

All constitutions are overthrown from within or without; the latter, when there is some government close at hand having an opposite interest, or at a distance, but powerful. This was exemplified by the Athenians and the Lacedaimonians. The Athenians everywhere put down the oligarchies, and the Lacedaimonians the democracies (Politics 1307b.20-24).

Thucydides himself is clear about stasis being widespread especially during the Peloponnesian War. In 3.82.1 in his account of stasis at Corcyra, an Athenian ally but not a member of the Delian League, he writes:

So bloody was the march of revolution (stasis) and the impression which it made was greater as it was one of the first to occur. Later on, one may say, the whole Hellenic world was convulsed; struggles being everywhere made by the popular leaders (tois ..ton demon prostatais) to bring in the Athenians, and by the oligarchs (tois oligois) to introduce the Spartans.

During the tumultuous events which saw the establishment of the oligarchy of 400 at Athens in 411, Thucydides makes it abundantly clear that the oligarchs, both before and during the months that they were in control of affairs at Athens, adopted the specific tactic of fomenting oligarchic revolts and the abolition of democracies in the cities (8.64.1; 65.1). The ‘Old Oligarch’, in his short treatise which spells out the opposition between the many and the few, and the tendency of each to favour their own kind (1.2-9) put it quite simply: ‘Throughout the world the aristocracy (lit. to belliston, the best element) are opposed to democracy (1.5).’

In places where sufficient evidence survives it is clear that stasis along these lines often played a significant part among the factors which determined whether or not a polis revolted and broke away from the Athenian-dominated Delian League. By way of illustration we can take three epigraphically attested poleis and three revolts attested in Thucydides. There is epigraphical evidence for stasis at Erythrai, Miletos and Kolophon. From Thucydides there is clear evidence of stasis at Mytilene (Lesbos), Samos and Chios. Presumably defecting poleis sometimes joined or,
effectively entered into alliance with, the Peloponnesian League or Sparta as was the case during Brasidas’ northern campaigns in 424 – 422. It was also the case during the resurgence of oligarchy in 412 and 411, and during the campaigns of Lysander in 405 and 404. Except at the end of the Peloponnesian War few of these revolts were long lived. A notable exception was Ephesos which revolted in 412 and remained in Persian hands to the end of the Peloponnesian War. The time when revolt was likely to have been at its most extensive was during the final two years of the Peloponnesian War for which we have relatively few details. It was fostered by the Spartan commander Lysander and was a consequence of direct military operations. As we will see, the stimulus of revolt was considered to be a realistic strategy in the conduct of the Peloponnesian War by the Spartans and their allies (for e.g. 1.81.2, 1.122.1, 8.99). On the basis of a preliminary count of poleis which almost certainly revolted during the Peloponnesian War, 31 out of 61 revolts have some evidence of stasis. This is significant given that for many poleis we have nothing more than the barest of details.

What of the other evidence for revolts? I have collected this together in ‘Revolts in the Athenian Empire: A Checklist’. In order to do so I have had to determine criteria for establishing the existence of a revolt. Some criteria allow for certainty but others are open to dispute.41

(1) Direct literary testimony.
(2) Inferences drawn from Athenian decrees and treaties including the imposition of a settlement dictated by the Athenians.
(3) Inferences drawn from the presence of either cleruchies, and/or garrisons, and/or proxeny decrees, especially those which contain a ‘harm clause’.
(4) Inferences drawn from absences of a polis or poleis from the Tribute Quota Lists.
(5) Inferences drawn from the payment of tribute by dependent poleis.
(6) Inferences drawn from irregular payment of tribute.
(7) Inferences drawn from significant variations in the amount of tribute paid, either an increase or a decrease.
(8) Inferences drawn from a polis being in the possession of, or receiving a visit from, either Spartans or Persians.
(9) Inferences drawn from horoi, sacred boundary stones for what are assumed to be Athenian deities, located out of Attica, such as Samos, Kos and, nearer to ‘home’, Aigina.42

Only number (1) admits of clear certainty but even then one’s scepticism about a source like Diodorus may cloud the issue. From my checklist of revolts I can state that there were 86 certain revolts for the period 478/7–404. Of these 25 fall within the period of the pentecontaetia (478/7 – 432/1) and 11 of these revolts were by

(Ionia: CPCInv.840; Thuc. 8.5.4; 8.6.12, 3-4; 8.7.1; 8.9.3; 8.14.2; DS 13.34.2; Plut. Alk. 24; 412/11 BC). See above note 2.

40 Ephesos (CPCInv.844); Thuc. 8.19.3; 109.1, Xen.Hell.1.2.6, 21.6, Plut. Alk. 29; Lysander 3-5.
41 Space dictates that I cannot give examples of all these criteria here. These are included in my ‘Revolts in the Athenian Empire: A Checklist’ (forthcoming).
poleis, several of them very small, on the island of Euboia. One also has to allow for those poleis who revolted twice, of which there are 21. Four poleis may have revolted more than twice. Another observation that can be made from my study of revolts is that they tended to cluster around specific dates or locations. They were not regular nor, until after 405, widespread occurrences. Thus, for example, we find a cluster of revolts in Thrace from 424 – 422, as a result of the presence of the Spartan general Brasidas. What is perhaps surprising is that other poleis, for example, those of Euboia or the Cyclades on Athens’ doorstep, or even those further afield in the Hellespont or in Ionia or in Karia, did not seize the opportunity to revolt and confront Athens with wars on several fronts. Similarly the many revolts of 412 – 411, fostered in part by the actions of Athenian oligarchs, did not see empire wide revolt, with most of the poleis which revolted during this period returning to the Athenian-led alliance. That further revolts did not occur is also remarkable in the light of several statements about revolts which Thucydides makes throughout his history. Not one of these specifically mentions tribute:

(1) 1.81.3 (432/1): Archidamus speaking at Sparta raises the possibility of fostering revolt as a strategy. ‘If we are to attempt an insurrection of their allies, these will have to be supported with a fleet, most of them being islanders.’
(2) 1.122.1 (432/1): The Corinthians raise revolt as a strategy. ‘We have other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of their allies.’
(3) 2.8.4-5 (431): Opposition to Athens was widespread. ‘Men’s feelings inclined much more to the Spartans, especially as they proclaimed themselves the liberators of Hellas. No private or public effort that could help them in speech or action was omitted…’ cf. 8.4.
(4) 3.36.2 (427) The Spartan strategy of assisting or fostering revolt was put into practice when, after along and critical delay, the Spartan fleet sailed to Lesbos to aid the Mytilenean oligarchs. But they were too late to be of any assistance.
(5) 3.82.1 (427) In his account of stasis at Corcyra stasis is assumed to be widespread, especially during the Peloponnesian War.
(6) 4.108.1-3 (424/3) With Brasidas in Thrace the Athenians ‘feared that more allies would revolt.’ Poleis in the region were eager to side with Brasidas with ‘each wishing to be the first to revolt.’
(7) 4.117.1 (423) The Athenians agreed to a one year truce with Brasidas so that they could ‘gain time to take precautions before Brasidas could procure the revolt of any more of their cities.’
(8) 8.2.2 (413/12) After the defeat in Sicily: ‘But, above all, the subjects (hypekooi) of the Athenians showed a readiness to revolt, even beyond their ability. cf. 8.4: During the winter of 413/4 the Athenians fortified Sounion and ‘above all kept a careful lookout against the revolt of their allies.’

One may speculate why this was the case. Perhaps those allies with Athens in the West (Thuc. 7.57) served as hostages against revolts in their home poleis. Athens still had forces in the Aegean (see above n.20) and Persia, to which elites in the poleis may have been inclined to turn for help, was occupied, in part at least, by the revolt of Amorges. Sparta, apart from garrisoning Dekeleia, could be slow in responding to calls for help made by pro-Spartan factions wishing to revolt as was the case at Mytilene in 427. Or, perhaps states were happy enough to live with the status quo and had joined the expedition against Syracuse sharing the same hopes of success evinced by the Athenians (cf. Thuc. 6.30).
8.64.1 (411) The Athenian oligarchs as part of their preparations for a *coup d’état*, ‘sent off half the envoys and Peisandros to do what was necessary at Athens (with instructions to establish oligarchies on the way in all the subject cities (*ton hypekoon poleon*) which they might touch at), and dispatched the other half in different directions to other dependencies (*ta hypekoa*).

8.65.1 (411) ‘Peisandros and his colleagues on their voyage by the coast overthrew the *demos* (‘democracies’) in the *poleis*, as planned.’

8.99.1 (411) It was the plan of Tisaphernes ‘to cause the revolt of the *poleis* in his province that were still subject to Athens.’

These passages, plus the existence of *stasis* in many of the *poleis*, would seem to suggest that, in cases where we have the evidence, factors other than tribute were the cause of revolts.

I conclude with a speculative hypothesis that states that what Thucydides has to say in 1.99 about tribute causing revolts perhaps has more to do with his observations about the 420’s and the impact of the Reassessment Decree of 425/4 (*IG I*3 71), and the other associated decrees of the 420’s about tribute,44 which saw both a rise in tribute and tighter regulation of its collection, than with the situation for much of the Pentekontaetia when most *poleis* converted voluntarily from ship contribution to tribute (1.99.3). Whereas elites (aristocratic, oligarchic, pro-Spartan) may have been prepared to pay tribute as a contribution to keeping the Persians at bay (what I call the ‘Persian factor’),45 they were not prepared to fund a war against their much-admired Sparta and its *eunomia*.46 Indeed if *IG V* (1) 1 which records contributions to the Spartan War Fund47 is correctly dated to 427, as argued by Loomis, then some members of the elites of the *poleis* mentioned were already showing their true allegiances by making contributions to Sparta.

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**Abbreviations:**


44 Kleonymos’ decree on the appointment of tribute collectors, 426 (*IG I*3 68, ML68, *ATEPW* 133); Kleinias’ decree on tribute collection which, along with Fornara and Samons (1991:179-81) I date to 425/4 (*IG I*3 34, ML 46, *ATEPW* 98); and the fragmentary decree on tribute *IG I*3 60 (ca. 430).

45 Eddy (1973).

46 On *eunomia* and its consequences for the *demos* see [Xen.] *Ath.Pol.* ‘The Old Oligarch’ 1.8-9.


IG *Inscriptiones Graecae*, Berlin, 1903-


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